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ABSTRACT 
 
Dynamically Typed Assembly Language (D-TAL) is not only a lightweight and effective 
solution to the gap generated by the drop in security produced by the translation of high-level 
language instructions to low-level language instructions, but it considerably eases up the burden 
generated by the level of complexity required to implement typed assembly languages statically. 
Although there are tradeoffs between the static and dynamic approaches, focusing on a dynamic 
approach leads to simpler, easier to reason about, and more feasible ways to understand 
deployment of types over monomorphically-typed or untyped intermediate languages. On this 
occasion, DISM, a simple but powerful and mature untyped assembly language, is extended by 
the addition of type annotations (on memory and registers) to produce an instance of D-TAL. 
Strong-DISM, the resulting language, statically, lends itself to simpler analysis about type access 
and security as the correlation between datatypes and instructions with their respective memory 
and registers becomes simpler to observe; while dynamically, it disallows operations and further 
eliminates conditions that from high level languages could be used to violate/circumvent 
security. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The proper implementation of a sound computing system requires a clear understanding 
of what security properties must be preserved by all intervening computing languages across all 
levels of computation.  
Typing, for high level languages, is commonly used as the preferred technique to 
establish and preserve soundness [1,12,15,16,17,18], as types and typing rules can be 
mathematically abstracted, calculated, and formally proven. This is the main reason why typing 
mechanisms are seen as powerful security tools and have become the standard safety validator 
for most high-level languages. 
 The addition of types can also be used in low level languages to prove soundness [2,18]. 
However, as the application of types has not been generalized to existing low-level models of 
computation, namely the Von Neumann and Harvard models [72,73,74,75,76,77], it is possible 
to improperly eliminate types during the translation process of programs from high to low-level 
languages. This elimination of types, as a consequence, creates an important gap in security for 
computations executed at low levels. Thus, if safety properties throughout the different layers of 
computation are not preserved and enforced, characteristics and properties that rendered a high 
level language as sound are by consequence lost, leaving the system vulnerable to inappropriate 
accesses to memory (i.e. buffer-overflows, format string attacks, integer overflows, etc.) [19]. As 
a matter of fact, many of the known exploits that take effect at low levels directly relate to 
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improperly translated high level programs allowed to execute at low levels. During the 
translation, some of the programs’ security properties are inadvertently eliminated, and the 
programs, assumed to be sound, are erroneously granted a trusted status when they are actually 
unsound and vulnerable. 
1.1.1  The Static Solution 
Several ideas to cope with this rift in security have been proposed. One of them, Proof 
Carrying Code (PCC) [33,34], is based on the general idea of a mechanism that allows an 
untrusted program to access system’s memory after the program has provided proof that it 
conforms to the system’s security requirements. Another proposition, descendant of PCC, is 
Typed Assembly Language (TAL) [2,8,13,14]. TAL is considered as an instance of PCC, and it 
proposes the use of the properties of types as a security mechanism to prove the soundness of a 
program’s execution. TAL requires that types are generalized over low level untyped 
intermediate languages, and once this generalization of types takes over, the safety properties of 
high level languages programs can be preserved during translation to equivalent lower level 
programs [24,25]. Successful implementations of TAL and PCC produced by researchers have 
been able to provide proofs that confirm it is possible to close the gap in security. 
The use of a static typing discipline for TAL implementations has been prevalent 
[2,8,13,14,16,18], and the resulting implementations, especially the initial ones, have been 
inherently convoluted. The reason behind this level of complexity has been that in order to derive 
formal proofs to demonstrate the correctness of programs after their transformation from a high 
level source language to a target typed assembly language, there has been needed to perform 
static analyses to deduce if the desired properties were still present after the transformation; 
hence, requiring the use of complex compilers, formal systems, proof checkers [3,4,5,6,7,23], 
and, in general, an extraordinary level of theoretical sophistication and expertise.  
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1.1.2  The Dynamic Option 
In contrast, the use of dynamic types for TAL implementations, which did not seem to 
have received the same attention by the research community, shows a great potential to alleviate 
much of the burden associated with the static approach to typing. This thesis presents, to the best 
of our knowledge, what it is believed to be the first implementation of a dynamically typed 
assembly language, especially one where types are preserved throughout all the relevant 
computational stages. Also, this thesis will not be concerned nor will include any compilation 
proof or analysis coming from a high level typed source language, but will simply focus on 
showing the different aspects required to achieve a dynamic TAL implementation.  
1.1.3  Thesis 
The exposition of the detailed steps of implementation and particulars on how to convert 
DISM [92], an untyped language, into Strong-DISM [93,94], a dynamically type checked 
assembly language, will be used to uncover beneficial aspects of a dynamic approach not 
previously investigated and to help realize why a dynamic typing discipline has important 
advantages over its static counterpart as it simplifies and makes visible important aspects 
concerning the implementation of typed assembly languages.  
1.2  Motivation 
The evaluation of the feasibility of a dynamically checked TAL, the lack of reliability of 
static typing for .NET and Java virtual machines [96], the need of a clearly understanding of the 
mechanics behind a dynamically typed low level system, and curiosity are the main motivations 
for this thesis. At a time, there was knowledge of the existence of typed assembly languages, but 
awareness grew as more details were gathered after previous TAL research was reviewed. This 
research in conjunction with attempting a D-TAL implementation, surprisingly revealed that the 
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approach taken on this thesis led to a simpler and sound alternative to previous statically typed 
implementations and clarified ways to extend type safety to other untyped assembly instances. 
1.3  Approach 
As the mechanisms used to implement D-TAL are crucial to show the benefits of a 
dynamic typing approach, a well-studied technique that surely prevents inappropriate access 
memory attacks by extending type safety to lower layers of computation has been selected for 
implementation.  
1.4  Contributions 
The enunciation of a clear and simple methodology of how to implement dynamically 
type checked assembly languages and, to the best of our knowledge, the first ever produced 
dynamically typed assembly language implementation (with type checking inclusive of all 
memory) are claimed as contributions of this thesis. 
1.5  Overview of Related Work 
Previous work and research considered as directly related to this thesis are Proof-
Carrying Code [33,34] and TAL [2,8,13,14,19,22,23,24,25,26,27] researches, as well as research 
made on gradual typing [29,68] and dynamic typing [66,67,69] areas. PCC proposes a way to 
prove correctness on untrusted code by using different certification mechanisms, while TAL, an 
instance of PCC, proposes the use the properties of types to establish safety.  Many foundational 
aspects of this thesis directly relate to theoretical concepts and practical mechanisms of gradual 
and dynamic typing. 
1.6  Static and Dynamic Typing Tradeoffs 
Static and dynamic typing disciplines complement each other [10,11]. However, some of 
their characteristics make them suitable (or desired) for specific types of implementation.  
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Desirable characteristics of statically type checking:  
§ All possible paths of execution are type checked.  
§ Earlier error checking. 
§ Lends itself to more structured programming styles. 
§ Object code can be generated more efficiently. 
§ Programs can handle a higher level of robustness. 
§ Finer-grained transformations from high level languages can be achieved. 
§ Compiled code is faster to execute 
§ Type checkers will catch type safety violations before code is executed. 
Undesirable characteristics of statically type checking: 
§ Valid programs can be ruled-out from executing. 
§ Language becomes less flexible with respect to the evaluation of expressions.  
§ Formal methods and theorem provers may be needed to verify programs. 
Other undesirable characteristics directly observed and/or inferred during research:  
§ The level of knowledge required to reason about compilation’s correctness can be 
cumbersome, imposing in many cases a high intellectual toll. 
§ Code generated tends to be complex and bloated. 
§ Type-preserving compilers, formal systems and proof-checking devices are 
needed to show code correctness in some instances.  
§ If an error is made in one of the components, the error could be hard to locate, and 
it could introduce security holes in the target system if unnoticed. 
§ Computational soundness can be lost due to physical hardware fluctuations. 
Desirable characteristics found on dynamically type checking: 
§ Abstract Data Types (ADTs) can be represented independently and modularly. 
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§ The resultant typed assembly language is directly programmable -as no compiler 
is required. 
§ The resultant typed assembly language can be used as a target language by any 
compiler. 
§ The language constructs and definitions are highly adaptable and flexible at 
design time. 
§ The code produced is less bloated. 
§ The abstraction model produced is cleaner and therefore simpler to analyze. 
§ Implementation can be done straightforwardly. 
§ Proving soundness is less cumbersome. 
Undesirable characteristics found on dynamically type checking: 
§ As type-checking occurs at runtime, code will execute slower than its static 
counterpart. 
§ Only the current path of execution is type-checked. 
§ An interpreter is required. 
1.7  Thesis Roadmap 
The following chapters will unwind as follows:  
§ Chapter II will be dedicated to Related Work.  
§ Chapter III will present DISM, the initial untyped language selected for this study, 
and will include its syntactic rules and operational semantics, followed by 
implementation details and code example. 
§ Chapter IV will present Strong-DISM. This is the resulting language after DISM 
has been type-extended. Furthermore, its syntactic rules and operational semantics 
will be included, followed by its implementation details and code example. 
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§ Chapter V will present an analysis of the added rules with respect to language 
soundness, an example of exploits eliminated by the use of types, and the 
benchmarks from running similar code using DISM and Strong-DISM 
instructions. 
§ Chapter VI will present a general exposition of how the type-extension technique 
described in chapter IV could be effectively applied to ARM assembly language 
or to any other untyped assembly language. 
§ Chapter VII will present the conclusions of this thesis with summary, 
recommendations, and possible paths of future work. 
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CHAPTER 2:  RELATED WORK 
 
2.1  Proof-Carrying Code 
PCC, proposed by George C. Necula and Peter Lee [33,34], is based on encoding a safety 
proof which contains the specification of the formal operational semantics of a native machine 
code language along with a set of rules to prove safety for all machine instructions.  
This approach allows to publish the safety rules requirements that any external code must 
conform to if it wished to be granted insertion and execution rights by the host code [33,34]. If 
the external code is certified and validated, it must be only because the external code is in full 
compliance with the previously published host code rules, and this external code can then be 
trusted and allowed to execute by the host [33,34].  
As type safety is one of the instances by which PCC certifies external code, D-TAL 
becomes an instance of PCC. However, the ways that PCC can certify code, go beyond types, 
and can be achieved by describing a meta-logic based certificate architecture [31]. 
2.2  Typed Assembly Language 
Typed assembly language, a direct instance of PCC, uses types and type derivations as 
proofs of correctness [22]. Seminal work from Morrisett’s ’95 thesis dissertation [2] paved the 
way of further TAL implementations by providing specifications on a series of techniques and 
formally proved that it was possible to statically map types from high level typed languages 
containing elements such as abstract datatypes (ADTs), objects, modules, first-class 
polymorphism, subtyping, etc. [2] to low level monomorphic languages. Such techniques were 
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called type-directed compilation and dynamic type dispatch. Type-directed compilation [27] 
referred to static typing, and dynamic type dispatch to a way of delaying a type substitution until 
the “right” moment. The proofs presented by Morrisett’s thesis were extensive and covered much 
of the translation of correctness at every step of compilation –done by intermediate compilers- 
from a high level ML-like language to a low level typed language, with their languages 
prototypes and compilers implementations included. It is important to mention that the dynamic 
type dispatch technique required the use of dynamic typing. In general, most types that cannot be 
determined statically at compile time are left to be type checked at runtime; therefore, some 
dynamic typing is needed sometimes to extend static types [2]. 
Further research produced TAL instances such as MTAL, that took steps to TAL’s 
consolidation by demonstrating correctness over object linking for a typed assembly language 
[8]; Stack-based Typed Assembly Language (STAL) [13], an extension of TAL with stack 
constructs and stack types to support modern architectures with stack allocation; and TALx86 
[22], which included the Popcorn compiler as part of the TALx86 Tools and proved over a real 
system that it is possible to establish correctness over code transformations from typed assembly 
language to machine code while still preserving security properties such as memory safety [2]. 
As more TAL implementations and research papers [2,8,13,14,18,19,20,22,23,24] 
appeared over the years, solid theoretical and practical foundation made it to newer 
implementations [17,20], and even to an experimental operating system [16]. D-TAL directly 
relates to and draws on much of the ideas and contributions made by TAL [15,16,19]. 
2.3  Dynamic Typing 
Dynamic typing is at the core of this thesis. Dynamic typing systems and the properties of 
dynamic type checking have been thoroughly studied [10,66,67]. A remarkable paper by Fritz 
  10 
Henglein, published in 1994 [69], describes a dynamically typed 𝜆-calculus to which our D-TAL 
implementation, Strong-DISM, shares a close resemblance with [93].  
In that paper Henglein talks about properties common to most dynamically typed 
languages such as runtime tagged values with their associated tagging and check-and-untag 
operations. He further describes the elements of type Dyn as runtime “(type) tagged” values or 
tag-value pairs where the tag indicates the type constructor or primitive type of the value 
component. Here is a description of the rules for dynamic type checking, as described by 
Henglein, that directly applies to this thesis: 
“For every type constructor tc of arity k there is a tagging operation tc! That maps 
elements of type tc(Dyn, . . . , Dyn) to Dyn by pairing them with their type…For every 
tagging operation tc! there is a corresponding check-and-untag operation tc? that maps 
elements of type Dyn to tc(Dyn, . . . , Dyn): it checks whether its argument has the tag tc; 
if so, it strips the tag and returns the untagged value; if not, it generates a (run-time) type 
error.” [69] 
Henglein also, amongst other proofs, produced proofs about safety when rewriting system 
properties, and minimally rewriting a system as well [69]. 
Other papers of relevancy to this thesis [65,66,67], with respect to the use of dynamic 
types, included further analyses of the topic over higher level languages with the inclusion of a 
formal calculi based on operational and denotational semantics. 
2.4  Gradual Typing 
The study of how the safety properties are preserved during the coalescing of static and 
dynamic typing disciplines has evolved into its own field, and it has been termed as gradual 
typing. Gradual typing is highly concerned with the preservation of a program semantic 
throughout its execution. 
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As many gradual typing systems rely on runtime type checking, a common problem to be 
solved by gradual typing systems is how soundness can be lost by the omission or improper type 
annotations. Most target languages that are dynamically typed are internally sound as their rules 
will not produce improper configurations (i.e.: stuck configuration) or undefined behavior (i.e.: 
memory corruption); however, in a gradual typing system, the gradual translations –when 
improperly done- may lead to a point in the translation in which values of the wrong type may 
inhabit variables with an already statically defined type, and this may further lead to unexpected 
hidden errors that are hard to debug. [65,68]. 
The goal of gradual typing is to enable the safe interaction of statically and dynamically 
typed code [29,66,67]. A gradual type system allows to define, before a program’s compilation 
or execution, which portions of such programs will be statically or dynamically typed and how 
type soundness will be preserved at each stage. 
A criteria of interest intrinsically relevant to this thesis that has been formalized 
[29,30,68,91] by gradual typing researchers are the concepts of open-world soundness and 
gradual guarantee. Open-world soundness states that a program that is well-typed, when 
translated from a gradually-typed language into an untyped target language, may interoperate 
arbitrarily with existing code at the untyped level without producing new –uncaught- type errors 
[29]. The premise of gradual guarantee asserts that no new errors are introduced by the 
weakening or removal of type annotations [91]. Both concepts, open-world soundness and 
gradual guarantee, were kept in observance all along the development of this thesis, especially 
during its implementation phase.  
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CHAPTER 3:  DISM 
 
This section will introduce and explain with details the characteristics of the base 
language selected for the language transformation studied in this thesis, from an untyped 
assembly language to a dynamically typed one, and will also explain why was the DISM 
implementation selected.  
3.1  Why DISM 
DISM offers the conceptual framework with the ideal characteristics required to analyze 
and visualize how an untyped assembly language is transformed into a typed assembly language, 
as DISM is a software-based interpreter [21], extensible, and designed to allow rapid 
implementation and prototyping.  
At first, some ARM development kits were considered, but they were found not to be 
flexible enough to perform the required customizations nor simple enough to provide a clear 
angle of observation for key concepts that, otherwise, would have been buried under complexity. 
Hence, DISM became the preferred tool for virtualization and rapid prototyping that allowed the 
insertion of experimental, abstract, and dynamic concepts into observable implementation.  
As added values, DISM is not only straightforward to use, but it is elegant, it is mature, 
and it is powerful. It also provides analysis tools that allow the live step-by-step detailed 
debugging of DISM programs. Indeed, DISM elicits the right level of abstraction to streamline 
how memory is utilized. Maybe, the best value found on DISM is its ability to highlight relevant 
aspects of computation. 
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3.2  DISM General Overview 
DISM stands for Diminished Instruction Set Machine [92] and includes the assembly 
language of a virtual machine that emulates a RISC processor [36,37]. As its instructions are 
based on standard RISC instructions [36,37], they are very alike. DISM instructions semantically 
mean operations on registers, memory –via addresses- or constant values, and because the 
operands for DISM instructions are all representing natural numbers, DISM is considered to be 
untyped. For this thesis, DISM is considered the base language from where our conversion takes 
place. 
3.3  DISM Data Structures 
Figure 3.1  DISM logical data structures. 
DISM has eight general purpose registers (see figure 3.1), a data memory array, a 
program counter (PC), and an implicit instruction’s array. The registers are represented by an 
integer array, indexed from 0 to 7. The data memory is represented by an array with space 
available for 65536 unsigned integer values and indexed from 0 to 65535. The program counter 
represents a register, and it is implemented by a variable that holds the index value for the next 
instruction to execute. There is also an implicit (and transparent to the programmer) integer array 
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that contains the program’s instructions and is created dynamically by a function that traverses 
the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the parsed DISM program being executed. This transparency 
allows for DISM instructions not to be modified and only executed. 
3.4  DISM Instructions 
 DISM has only twelve atomic instructions, and they contribute to the overall computation 
by producing side-effects over given memory types. DISM instructions are designed to operate 
on any of the 8 general purpose registers and can only interact with the data memory to perform 
data reads and writes via the lod and str instructions respectively. Figure 3.2, extracted from the 
version 0.5 of the “Definition of DISM” [92], contains all DISM instructions and their 
definitions.  
 
Figure 3.2  DISM instructions, opcodes and definitions. 
Extending on the DISM instructions, opcodes and definitions provided in figure 3.2, n 
stands for a natural number, i for an integer, s for a source memory –the memory or register from 
where a value is read-, and d for a destination memory –the memory or register to where a value 
is written. The lod and str instructions automatically check that the programs can only access 
data within the DISM’s allocated data memory. The beq, bgt and jmp instructions have in 
common that they can write to the program counter (PC) and, therefore, set value of the next 
instruction to be executed. The beq and bgt instructions are comparison-based, and the jmp 
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instruction uses pointer arithmetic to find a given instruction. In DISM, writes to the PC are 
guaranteed to be values to instructions that are part of the program, or otherwise, an exception 
terminates the program’s execution; this behavior is transparently enforced by DISM. Also, 
opcodes -or tokens used to denote instructions- are restricted to be in lowercase, and all DISM 
programs must successfully be ended with the hlt instruction. This rule is with the purpose of 
disallowing a DISM program from executing nonexistent instructions.  
DISM provides for the use of comments and symbolic labels. DISM considers comments 
any combination of characters after the ASCII semicolon symbol. To declare a symbolic label, 
the ‘#’ symbol must be followed by an ASCII sequence of characters, in any combination, that 
includes the set of upper and lowercase letters from the Latin alphabet and the digits from ‘0’ to 
‘9’ ended with the ASCII colon symbol.  
Declarations of symbolic labels must always happen before an instruction. After a 
symbolic label has been declared, it can be utilized as a reference to an instruction, and 
consequently, can be used to replace the value to be written as argument to set the PC. An 
example that illustrates the use of symbolic labels can be found on section 3.6.  
3.5  DISM Interpretation 
Before execution, a DISM program is converted to an AST object, and all checks are 
performed dynamically by the DISM interpreter on this object. During the initialization of the 
virtual machine, all the values on the registers and memory array are initialized with the integer 
value ‘0’. The PC gets initialized with integer value ‘0’ as well, referencing the location of first 
instruction on the instruction’s array.  
At execution time, the PC is incremented by 1 every time an instruction is executed –with 
the occasional exception of instructions that write to the PC- thus the PC is always referencing to 
the next program instruction on the instruction’s array. Additionally, the instruction being 
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executed and the contents of registers and memory right after the instruction’s execution can be 
output to the screen if debug mode is activated.  
3.6  DISM Security Considerations 
Although DISM provides beneficial runtime checks, e.g.: making sure programs can only 
execute instructions that are part of the program, DISM is untyped and uses a homogeneous 
positive (including zero) integer-based datatype for all its values. This single type makes 
possible that the values inhabiting a memory resource (i.e.: PC, registers, memory) can be 
effectively used to inhabit as values of any other memory resource, which makes possible the 
usage of this characteristic to create untyped-based exploits. Further, because of its single type 
encoding design, DISM does not have to check types. Any program that encoded types to be run 
on DISM would have to consider DISM mechanics in order to guarantee a safe execution. 
3.7  A DISM Program Example 
The following code corresponds to two equivalent DISM programs [25]. They illustrate 
the use of symbolic labels. 
Program 1 uses symbolic labels. 
rdn 1 ;read n into register 1  
rdn 2 ;read m into register 2  
mov 3 1 ;move value 1 into register 3  
#LOOP: beq 2 0 #END ;if m==0 then goto end  
ptn 1 ;print n  
sub 2 2 3 ;decrement m  
jmp 0 #LOOP ;goto loop beginning 
#END:  hlt 0 ;halt with code 0 
 
Program 2 does not use symbolic labels. 
rdn 1 ;read n into register 1 
rdn 2 ;read m into register 2 
mov 3 1 ;move value 1 into register 3 
beq 2 0 7 ;if m==0 then goto end 
ptn 1 ;print n 
sub 2 2 3 ;decrement m 
jmp 0 3 ;goto loop beginning 
hlt 0 ;halt with code 0 
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CHAPTER 4:  Strong-DISM, A D-TAL INSTANCE 
 
Strong-DISM is the result of a series of straightforward enhancements to DISM. It 
encodes more than one type by making its instructions aware of types and adds dynamic type 
checking. The results of these enhancements produced an instance of TAL, and beyond, an 
instance of D-TAL.  
As types were implicitly added to the instructions operands and yielding values, type 
checking enforced that registers and memory always contained the proper type of value. In order 
to support these implicit types and dynamic type checking, it was needed to add new 
instructions, reclassify existing instructions, extend the underlying support mechanism, and 
restructure the existing data structures. Once the conversion from DISM to a D-TAL had been 
completed, all the benefits of types were extended to any Strong-DISM program directly created 
by a programmer or to any higher-level program translated by a compiler into Strong-DISM. The 
resulting language contains the necessary elements to be able to cope with proof carrying by 
means of type checking [15].  
As the scope of this thesis just focused on providing the minimal required functionality to 
support a safe program translation from a higher level language and focused on the analysis of a 
Strong-DISM program’s runtime conditions, all the burden of compilations and the submission 
of a proof to show that it is possible a sound and gradual translation from a higher level language 
was left out as this type of proofs have been covered by previous TAL research [9,10,15]. Also, 
to be completely fair, it must be mentioned that most of the heavy lifting and initial work had 
been already done on DISM; thus, the work of modifying the base language became simpler. 
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Note how this approach, as it builds on existing work, allows the saving of considerable amounts 
of time and effort, when converting existing untyped assembly languages to typed assembly 
languages, especially if the base language is an already mature implementation, as in the case of 
DISM. 
4.1  Strong-DISM General Overview 
Strong-DISM is directly derived from DISM, and, as DISM, is the assembly language of 
a virtual machine that emulates a RISC processor. Strong-DISM instructions are based also on 
standard RISC instructions [39,40], and are semantically connected to operations on registers, 
memory –via addresses– or constant values. However, such operations are not performed on (or 
yield) a single type. Instead, Strong-DISM’s instructions can be performed on, yield, and are 
represented by two types: nat (natural numbers) and inst (references to code instructions) types; 
hence, Strong-DISM can be considered a typed assembly language, or to be more precise, a 
dynamically typed assembly language.  
4.1.1  Strong-SIM and Strong_Mem-SIM 
To better understand how effective abstract concepts behaved when applied to a real 
model, two implementations of Strong-DISM were produced [93][94]. The name of the 
executable for the first implementation was strong-sim-dism, and it contained the abstract idea of 
keeping track of types in data memory by physically segregating memory. The second 
implementation’s executable was called strong_mem-sim-dism. This second implementation did 
not separate physical memory by types, but placed all type-flagged values next to each other in a 
continuous array. Following on, strong-sim-dism implementation could be referred to as Strong-
SIM, while strong_mem-sim-dism could be referred to as Strong_Mem-SIM.  
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4.2  Strong-DISM Data Structures 
Both, Strong_Mem-SIM and Strong-SIM (see figures 4.1 and 4.2), inherited from DISM 
the general purpose registers (numbered from 0 to 7), the program-counter register, the implicit 
and transparent-to-the-programmer program instruction’s array, and the data memory. However, 
there were substantial differences for both implementations of Strong-DISM. 
4.2.1  Data Structures Implementation for Strong-SIM  
 For the Strong-SIM [93], the registers array inherited from DISM was left untouched, 
and register’s support to keep track of nat and inst types was made possible by the addition of an 
extra array of eight elements. The elements of this array were indexed after the register’s array, 
and they keep track of the types of the values in registers inhabiting a similar index (see figure 
4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1  Strong-SIM logical data structures. 
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With respect to memory dedicated to data storage, the Strong-SIM implementation has 
two physically separated and distinct unsigned integer arrays to store nat and inst values 
respectively, being each of the arrays indexed from 0 to 32767 and each containing 32768 
elements. 
4.2.2  Data Structures Implementation for Strong_Mem-SIM 
For Strong_Mem-SIM [94], the underlying DISM data structure used to represent the 
registers array was replaced by a double unsigned integer array (see figure 4.2), having one of 
the subarrays utilized to store register’s values while the other used to annotate the nat or inst 
types of values inhabiting the elements of the first subarray at the same index. 
 
Figure 4.2  Strong_Mem-SIM logical data structures. 
 
The implementation of memory, matched the registers’ implementation, but this time the 
unsigned integer array contained 65536 elements, indexed from 0 to 65535. This 2-D array was 
also used exactly as the register’s array was used. The elements of one subarray stored values, 
and the other stored the types of the values residing at the same index of the values subarray.  
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4.3  Strong-DISM Instructions 
Strong-DISM has twenty instructions (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below). These instructions 
are all atomic and designed to produce a meaningful computation via side effects on memory. 
Except eight new instructions (mvc, ldc, ltm, ltr, stc, rdc, bec, and ptr), the remaining ones, 
inherited from DISM, use the same opcodes and produced exactly the same results as in DISM. 
 
Instruction                 Machine Operation   
 add d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat + R[s2]:nat 
sub d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat - R[s2]:nat 
(R[d]:nat <-0:nat when R[s2]:nat > R[s1]:nat) 
mul d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat * R[s2]:nat 
mov d:nat n:nat            R[d]:nat <- n:nat 
mvc d:inst cp:inst         R[d]:inst <- cp:inst 
lod d:nat s:nat i     R[d]:nat <- N[R[s]:nat + i]:nat  
ldc d:inst s:nat i     R[d]:inst <- C[R[s]:nat + i]:inst  
ltr d:nat s:nat     R[d]:nat <- T[s]:typ when s<>d 
str d:nat i s:nat     N[R[d]:nat + i]:nat <- R[s]:nat  
stc d:nat i s:inst     C[R[d]:nat + i]:inst <- R[s]:inst  
jmp s:inst i     PC <- {R[s]:inst + i}:inst 
beq s1:nat s2:nat n:inst    If R[s1]:nat = R[s2]:nat then PC <- n:inst 
bec s1:inst s2:inst n:inst  If R[s1]:inst = R[s2]:inst then PC <- n:inst 
bgt s1:nat s2:nat n:inst   If R[s1]:nat > R[s2]:nat then PC <- n:inst 
rdn d:nat                  Read natural number from screen into R[d]:nat 
rdc d:inst                 Read an instruction reference from screen into R[d]:inst 
ptn s:nat                  Print value of register R[s]:(nat or inst) to screen 
ptr s:nat                  Print type of register T[s]:typ to screen 
hlt s:nat                   Halt the Strong-DISM with code R[s]:nat 
Figure 4.3  Strong-DISM instructions, opcodes and definitions used on strong-sim-dism 
simulator. 
 
For both, Strong-SIM and Strong_Mem-SIM implementations, all instructions behave exactly the 
same way with the exception of the ltm instruction. The ltm instruction, due to the way memory 
was implemented, is only particular to the Strong_Mem-SIM implementation of Strong-DISM. 
Type annotations shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4 are for programmers to understand how to 
associate the instructions opcodes with their corresponding operands’ and yielding types. In 
practice, for strong-sim-dism and strong_mem-sim-dism simulators, types are implicitly 
annotated, being their inference and type-checking dynamically calculated. 
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Instruction          Machine Operation   
 add d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat + R[s2]:nat 
sub d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat - R[s2]:nat 
(R[d]:nat <-0:nat when R[s2]:nat > R[s1]:nat) 
mul d:nat s1:nat s2:nat    R[d]:nat <- R[s1]:nat * R[s2]:nat 
mov d:nat n:nat            R[d]:nat <- n:nat 
mvc d:inst cp:inst         R[d]:inst <- cp:inst 
lod d:nat s:nat i     R[d]:nat <- M[R[s]:nat + i]:nat  
ldc d:inst s:nat i     R[d]:inst <- M[R[s]:nat + i]:inst  
ltm d:nat s:nat i     R[d]:nat <- (M[R[s]:nat + i]):typ 
ltr d:nat s:nat     R[d]:nat <- (R[s]):typ when s<>d 
str d:nat i s:nat     M[R[d]:nat + i]:nat <- R[s]:nat  
stc d:nat i s:inst     M[R[d]:nat + i]:inst <- R[s]:inst  
jmp s:inst i     PC <- {R[s]:inst + i}:inst 
beq s1:nat s2:nat n:inst    If R[s1]:nat = R[s2]:nat then PC <- n:inst 
bec s1:inst s2:inst n:inst  If R[s1]:inst = R[s2]:inst then PC <- n:inst 
bgt s1:nat s2:nat n:inst   If R[s1]:nat > R[s2]:nat then PC <- n:inst 
rdn d:nat                  Read natural number from screen into R[d]:nat 
rdc d:inst                 Read an instruction reference from screen into R[d]:inst 
ptn s:nat                  Print value of register R[s]:(nat or inst) to screen 
ptr s:nat                  Print type of register R[s]:typ to screen 
     hlt s:nat                   Halt the Strong-DISM with code R[s]:nat 
 
Figure 4.4  Strong-DISM instructions, opcodes and definitions used on strong_mem-sim-dism 
simulator. 
 
To further clarify on the Strong-DISM instructions presented in figures 4.3 and 4.4, n can 
be replaced only for a natural number, i for an integer, s for a source memory (from where a 
value is read), and d for a destination memory (to where a value is written). typ denotes a natural 
number value assigned by Strong-DISM to represent a type. Both Strong-SIM and Strong_Mem-
SIM implementations encode ‘0’ and ‘1’ nat values as typ values to keep track of nat and inst 
types respectively. Although typ values can treated as nat data, they cannot be assigned nor 
modified by the programmer. 
The lod and str instructions automatically check that programs can only access nat typed 
memory, and the ldc and stc instructions enforce that programs can only access inst typed 
memory. As in DISM, the jmp, beq, and bgt instructions, in conjunction with the newer bec 
instruction, can write to the PC, and Strong-DISM –as DISM does- transparently ensures that the 
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PC can only be written with references to instructions that are part of the program. In the case of 
jmp instruction, the operand for this instruction must be of type inst. The ltm and ltr instructions 
allow to check the type of a value in memory or in a register respectively. Note that the ltm 
instruction is not present in Strong-SIM, as memories for nat and inst types are physically 
separated; therefore, this instruction becomes implicit for Strong-SIM. All other instruction 
including rdc, rdn, ptr, and ptn facilitate the interaction with a program’s user by allowing the 
input or output of data. Finally, note that instructions will accordingly set the register’s type flags 
(and memory type flags for the case of strong_mem-sim-dism) after a successful type checking.  
As in DISM, opcodes are restricted to be in lowercase, and all Strong-DISM programs 
must successfully be ended with the hlt instruction. This rule disallows a program from 
executing nonexistent instructions. The hlt instruction is of type nat. Comments and symbolic 
labels are inherited from DISM and behave the same way. Section 4.6 contains an example of the 
use of symbolic labels in Strong-DISM. 
4.4  Strong-DISM Implementation 
 
Although some of the register and memory implementations’ details have been already 
revealed, there are still some pertinent operational details to be mentioned. All Strong-DISM 
programs, before being executed, are converted into an AST object that is dynamically 
evaluated. During the initialization of the virtual machine, all the values of the registers, type 
flags, PC and arrays are initialized to the symbol ‘0’, which may have a different meaning on 
each instance. For example, initializing all type flags to zero is equivalent to initializing all 
memory and register to the nat type; while the PC would be pointing to the first instruction.  
During execution, the PC is incremented by 1 every time an instruction is executed –with 
the exception of instructions that write to the PC– thus the PC is always referencing to the next 
program instruction on the instruction’s array. Each instruction that is executed is dynamically 
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type checked in a specific order. For example, the add instruction first checks the types of the 
source registers corresponding to the second and third operands, to later set the type flag of the 
destination register to a nat type and finally writes the results of the addition as a value to the 
destination register.  This whole instruction is considered to be performed atomically, and a 
further observation is that if multiple programs could be interpreted concurrently, then the value-
and-type updates are to be performed atomically.  
Although Strong-DISM inherits the DISM mechanism that ensures that every instruction 
being executed belongs to the program, instructions like mvc, ldc, and rdc that could potentially 
allow the insertion of an inst value that does not belong to the program; hence, Strong-DISM 
verifies that any value inserted by means of any of these instructions exist in the AST object. 
Furthermore, as the yielding types of the mvc, ldc, stc, jmp, beq, bec, bgt, and rdc instructions 
are of type inst, Strong-DISM guarantees that values from these instructions are written to the 
appropriate memory or register type. 
4.5  Strong-DISM Security 
Previous research has demonstrated that typed assembly languages, when used as target 
languages, are fully capable of extending the type soundness guarantees provided by higher level 
languages [23,24]. Even though Strong-DISM is an instance of the simplest typed assembly 
language, as it has the minimal amount of types possible, does not lessen at all the intrinsic level 
of protection offered by types. Just adding types eliminates the classic version of the buffer –or 
stack– overflow exploits (see section 5.4), as the language guarantees that values of a given type 
will be accessed under the rules created for that specific type. Another aspect not to be 
overlooked is that higher level types need to be accompanied by the corresponding set of 
instructions so that the safety properties of programs are preserved by the target language when 
translated from higher level languages. When considering the typing rules of each new 
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instruction added to the target typed assembly language is paramount to be extremely careful to 
avoid puncturing the implicit soundness of types.  
Strong-DISM does not prevent the execution of programs with levels of logic above the 
level of the language that may contain erroneous logic or malicious intentions; however, the 
language contains an articulated set of typed instructions that guarantee that types will be 
appropriately accessed and yielded; thus automatically and properly preserving types along the 
computation. This preservation of types is consistent with concept of preserving safety properties 
in a program, and can be used to prove that a program will behave as expected during all phases 
of its execution. 
4.6  A Strong-DISM Program Example 
The following code is the Strong-DISM equivalent to the first DISM programs shown in 
chapter 3.7 as it uses symbolic labels. 
Program 1 uses symbolic labels. 
mvc 0 0 ;move value 0 into register 0 
mov 1 0 ;move value 0 into register 1 
rdn 2  ;read n into register 2  
rdn 3  ;read m into register 3  
mov 4 1 ;move value 1 into register 4 
#LOOP: beq 2 1 #END ;if m==0 then goto end 
ptn 2 ;print n   
sub 3 3 4 ;decrement m 
jmp 0 #LOOP ;goto loop beginning 
#END: hlt 0 ;halt with code 0 
 
Program 2 does not use symbolic labels. 
mvc 0 0 ;move value 0 into register 0 
mov 1 0 ;move value 0 into register 1 
rdn 2  ;read n into register 2  
rdn 3  ;read m into register 3  
mov 4 1 ;move value 1 into register 4 
       beq 2 1 9    ;if m==0 then goto end 
ptn 2 ;print n   
sub 3 3 4 ;decrement m 
jmp 0 5 ;goto loop beginning 
      hlt 0 ;halt with code 0 
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Note that most DISM programs can be executed on Strong-SIM and Strong_Mem-SIM, 
and all Strong-SIM programs can be executed by Strong_Mem-SIM. On the other hand, not all 
Strong_Mem-SIM programs cannot be executed by Strong-SIM nor by the DISM simulator. 
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CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS AND TESTING 
 
 This chapter presents the results of different benchmarking tests destined to compare how 
the added dynamic type checking is detrimental to the runtime performance of Strong-DISM 
against DISM. Some analyses of how type checking occur may be presented in some cases. All 
the binaries for the simulators, their definitions, the code used to create the benchmark program, 
and all the test files are available for download and closer examination at: 
http://research.binaryworldnexus.com 
5.1  The Impact of Type Checking for Strong-DISM Performance 
 Type checking of Strong-DISM instructions (see ‘Machine Operations’ section from 
figures 4.3 and 4.4) extends the checks already performed by DISM. For example, the DISM 
version of the sub instruction checks that the registers declared on the instruction are valid, and 
that the minuend value is larger than the subtrahend. The same instruction for Strong-DISM 
requires two additional checks: the types of the registers for where the values for the minuend 
and subtrahend reside must be nat. Strong-DISM, additionally, has to set the value of the flag for 
the destination register to nat as well. As the number of check and writes increase, the amount of 
computations needed per instruction increases as well, and this increase may significantly reflect 
on the overall performance, feasibility, and worthiness of the enhancements. With that in mind, a 
series of runs to benchmark performance were realized. 
5.2  Benchmarking Strong-DISM and DISM Instructions 
In order to produce comparable benchmarks to analyze how the addition of type checking 
significantly affected the performance of Strong-DISM against the performance of DISM, a 
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series of DISM and Strong-DISM assembly programs of varying complexity were used with the 
following intentions: first, to compare the executions of the same DISM program in the DISM 
simulator (sim-dism) against (when possible) the two implementations of Strong-DISM 
simulators (strong-sim-dism and strong_mem-sim-dism). Second, to compare equivalent DISM 
and Strong-DISM programs containing each one instances of their particular set of instructions. 
Also, as the exact number of instructions for DISM and Strong-DISM is known, the dynamic 
order of execution of instructions is known, and the underlying data structures are known, a 
more precise calculation of the amount of instructions executed is possible to be combined with 
logical analysis about how the underlying data structures were accessed by the interpreters, and 
how the interaction of some other system factors may have affected the benchmark results. 
In general, five DISM programs were used. These programs were conceived so that they 
could be run on the DISM simulator and on any of the two of Strong-DISM simulators. Then, 
out of the original five DISM programs, the logic of three of these was replicated to produce 
equivalent Strong-DISM programs able to be run on all of the Strong-DISM simulators; while 
the remaining two programs, since they contained the ltm instruction, were replicated to be run 
only on Strong_Mem-DISM simulator.  
Each of the programs was executed 100,000 times in a round robin fashion and 
benchmarked in the following order: 1) simple.dism, and simple.stdism, 2) nm.dism, and 
nm.stdism, 3) edgy.dism, and edgy.stmdism, 4) divide_nat.dism, and divide_nat.stdism, 5) 
stor_lod_test.dism, and stor_lod_test.stmdism. Programs with extension ‘.dism’ were executed 
by all interpreters; programs with extension ‘.stdism’ were executed by strong-sim-dism and 
strong_mem-sim-dism; and programs with extension ’.stmdism’ could only be executed by 
strong_mem-sim-dism. 
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Table 5.1: Statistics for all executables on simple.dism. 
 Filename: simple 
Filename language: DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.01 Average: 6.02 Average: 6.04 
Total: 601421 Total: 602000 Total: 603900 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 175.16 Average: 174.83 Average: 175.17 
Total: 17516189 Total: 17483230 Total: 17517487 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement 
over a DISM program on the same file: -0.16% -0.49% 
 
 
Table 5.2: Statistics for simple.dism and simple.stdism. 
 Filename: simple 
Language: DISM 
Filename: simple 
Language: Strong-DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.01 Average: 6.03 Average: 6.04 
Total: 601421 Total: 603231 Total: 604016 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 175.16 Average: 175.16 Average: 174.97 
Total: 17516189 Total: 17516403 Total: 17497193 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement over a 
DISM program on equivalent files: -0.33% -0.49% 
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Table 5.3: Statistics for all executables on nm.dism. 
 Filename: nm 
Filename language: DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.57 Average: 6.69 Average: 6.77 
Total: 657221 Total: 669140 Total: 677072 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 192.46 Average: 192.16 Average: 192.19 
Total: 19246126 Total: 19215646 Total: 19219049 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement 
over a DISM program on the same file: -1.82% -3.04% 
 
 
Table 5.4: Statistics for executing nm.dism on sim-dism, and nm.stdism on all Strong-DISM 
simulators. 
 Filename: nm 
Language: DISM 
Filename: nm 
Language: Strong-DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.57 Average: 6.59 Average: 6.79 
Total: 657221 Total: 658760 Total: 679103 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 192.46 Average: 192.21 Average: 192.18 
Total: 19246126 Total: 19220825 Total: 19217532 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement over 
a DISM program on equivalent files: -0.3% -3.34% 
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Table 5.5: Statistics for all executables on edgy.dism. 
 Filename: edgy 
Filename language: DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.93 Average: 7.07 Average: 6.93 
Total: 693295 Total: 706543 Total: 693290 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 200.20 Average: 203.93 Average: 198.80 
Total: 20020409 Total: 20392669 Total: 19880215 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement 
over a DISM program on the same file: -2.02% 0% 
 
 
Table 5.6: Statistics for executing edgy.dism on sim-dism, and edgy.stdism on strong_mem-sim-
dism. 
 Filename: edgy 
Language: DISM 
Filename: edgy 
Language: Strong_Mem-DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 6.93 Average: 7.01 
Total: 693295 Total: 701144 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 200.20 Average: 200.84 
Total: 20020409 Total: 20083714 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement over a 
DISM program on equivalent files: -1.15% 
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Table 5.7: Statistics for all executables on divide_nat.dism. 
 Filename: divide_nat 
Filename language: DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 8.90 Average: 8.94 Average: 8.94 
Total: 890159 Total: 893509 Total: 894440 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 236.25 Average: 237.62 Average: 234.66 
Total: 23624834 Total: 23762027 Total: 23465721 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement 
over a DISM program on the same file: -0.45% -0.45% 
 
 
Table 5.8: Statistics for executing divide_nat.dism on sim-dism, and divide_nat.stdism on all 
Strong-DISM simulators. 
 Filename: divide_nat 
Language: DISM 
Filename: divide_nat 
Language: Strong-DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 8.90 Average: 9.01 Average: 9.23 
Total: 890159 Total: 900632 Total: 923472 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 236.25 Average: 236.53 Average: 237.69 
Total: 23624834 Total: 23652618 Total: 23769484 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement over 
a DISM program on equivalent files: -1.23% -3.7% 
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Table 5.9: Statistics for all executables on stor_lod_test.dism. 
 Filename: stor_lod_test 
Filename language: DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong-sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 7.64 Average: 7.98 Average: 7.73 
Total: 763500 Total: 798215 Total: 773144 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 180.27 Average: 186.52 Average: 180.11 
Total: 18027276 Total: 18652251 Total: 18011302 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement 
over a DISM program on the same file: -4.45% -1.17% 
 
 
Table 5.10: Statistics for executing stor_lod_test.dism on sim-dism, and stor_lod_test.stdism on 
strong_mem-sim-dism. 
 Filename: stor_lod_test 
Language: DISM 
Filename: stor_lod_test 
Language: Strong_Mem-DISM 
Executing 
Programs: 
sim-dism strong_mem-sim-dism 
User Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 7.64 Average: 7.71 
Total: 763500 Total: 771170 
System Time  
(in microseconds) 
Average: 180.27 Average: 178.66 
Total: 18027276 Total: 17866240 
AVG user time % of (+/-) improvement over a 
DISM program on equivalent files: -0.91% 
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Benchmarking was performed on a Unix system running OS X ‘EL Capitan’. The system 
had a quad-core Intel Core i7 processor running at 2.2 GHz, 16 GB of 1600 MHz DDR3 
memory, and a solid state drive of 1 TB capable of read/write speeds of up to 2GBps.  The 
program responsible for benchmarking the executables was written in C. At its core, the program 
consisted of two nested for loops. The inner loop called the time.h’s library function getrusage 
before and after a call to the system function from the stdlib.h library. The system call executed a 
set of programs matched with their different possible interpreters as around robin. The outer loop 
executed its contents 100,000 times in this instance. The user time was computed by adding the 
ru_utime.tv_sec and ru_utime.tv_usec values of each program, while the system time was 
computed as the user time but using the ru_stime.tv_sec and ru_stime.tv_usec values. 
5.3  What the Benchmarks Indicate 
Tables 5.1 to 5.10 show the results of the performance of Strong-DISM for its two 
implementations, against the performance of DISM’s implementation. Average and total times 
are all given in microseconds. The results are separated by user time, the time it takes a program 
to perform its instructions, and by system time, the time it takes the system to perform system’s 
operations related to the program being executed but at the kernel level.  
In the case of user time, the time of our interest, it contains a blend of code statements 
that range from creating the DISM or Strong-DISM program’s AST object –which is 
negligible— to interpreting the program instructions, which in some cases produce outputs to the 
screen. There are two types of resulting tables, the ones that show the three simulators (sim-dism, 
strong-sim-dism, and strong_mem-sim-dism) running the same DISM program, and the ones 
where the run of a DISM program is compared against an equivalent Strong-DISM program, 
each one being ran on its respective simulator.  
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In the first case, the idea is to observe how fast the DISM instructions are run by Strong-
DISM implementations despite the added type checks and the memory reorganization. In the 
second case, the idea is to observe how two equivalent programs one created and containing 
instructions particular to DISM compares with an equivalent one designed to carry out most of 
the instructions particular to Strong-DISM. In the second case, the correspondence would not be 
in a one to one fashion, but would suggest how fast or slow would Strong-DISM programs run 
against their DISM counterparts. At the bottom of every table, a value in the form of a 
percentage indicates how fast or slow the Strong-DISM simulators performed against the DISM 
simulator on the same or an equivalent program. A valid note is that for all DISM programs to be 
able to run on any of the Strong-DISM interpreters, they are not to contain the DISM version of 
the jmp instruction. So, this instruction has been appropriately replaced by the branching beq and 
bgt instructions. 
For example, if DISM interpreter spends 10 microseconds executing program1.dism, and 
Strong-DISM spends 11 microseconds executing the same program, then the Strong-DISM 
interpreter will have spent 1 microsecond more than the DISM interpreter or 10% more time. 
Therefore, the percentage of improvement on 10 microseconds is reflected as a negative 
percentage (-10%), because Strong-DISM took more time to execute the same program, and 
therefore, it performed slower. Had Strong-DISM executed the program in 9.8 microseconds, 
then there had been an improvement of 2%, as Strong-DISM would completed its execution 0.2 
microseconds sooner than DISM; thus performing faster. 
As it was expected, Strong-DISM implementations performed slightly slower than 
DISM’s, being the only exception the execution of program edgy.dism (See tables 5.5 and 5.6). 
This program simulates a user inputting the nodes and edges on a connected graph, to later, print 
the edges of the recalled nodes. The simulated input of a user entering the edges for given nodes 
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was 1,1,1,2,1,3,1,4,2,2,2,3,2,4,3,3,3,4,4,4,0; followed by the input 1 to output edges of node 1 
would output 1,2,3,4; the input 2 to output edges of node 2 would output 2,3,4; the input 3 for 
node 3 would output 3,4; and the input 4 for node 4 would output 4. Finally, the input 0 would 
terminate the program. This program, as it executes, makes many reads and writes to not 
contiguous memory elements in order to store and recall the nodes and edges at a location in 
memory; performs all its computations over nat values to calculate edges and nodes initial 
locations; and jumps randomly plenty of times. The equivalent program with extension 
‘.stmdism’ contains the same instructions, except that it uses the ltm instruction and has an added 
subroutine to branch to a halt if the expected type of the value found in memory is not of the type 
nat.  
The speculative observation indicates that strong_mem-sim-dism and sim-dism 
implementations made the same jumps when interpreting the DISM native program as both 
interpreters share a similar register and continuous memory structure. The only difference is that 
the typed interpreter uses a double array for its memory and registers, but this seems to be 
negligible when type checking values at a memory, or at a register, as they both benchmarked 
the same time (0% difference) with very similar system times. However, there were some more 
jumps for strong-sim-dism occurring probably between the type, segregated memories, and 
register arrays as it reflected an extra -2.02% time consumption. Because both implementations 
of Strong-DISM performed the same type checking of the native DISM program, the time spend 
for type checking could be discarded as one of them tied in execution, leaving only the 
additional jumps between arrays as reasons for the differential –observe how system time is 
higher. 
Later, when the Strong-DISM native file was executed on strong_mem-sim-dism it 
yielded a negative 1.15%, and this toll on performance can be traced to the use of the ltm 
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instruction in conjunction with an extra comparison the program does. In this instance the 
amount of system time does not increase by much.  
Programs containing this type of instructions do not seem to impact by much the 
performance of Strong-DISM when compared to DISM, especially the performance where the 
memory is continuous; less than a 1.5% decrease in performance does not seem to be a negative 
tradeoff when gaining the possibility of soundness is at stake. 
For stor_lod_test.dism (See tables 5.9 and 5.10), a program very similar to edgy.dism, 
Strong-DISM implementations performed similarly to edgy.dism. Strong-DISM interpreters 
degraded their performance executing a native DISM program to -4.45% for strong-sim-dism, 
and -1.17% for strong_mem-sim-dim. Here the difference was that the writes and reads made by 
the program were not too randomized, but over contiguous memory, and that the jumps in 
memory were neither too distant from each other’s locations. The same patterns observed for 
edgy.dism re-emerged during this execution. stor_lod_test.stmdism, the equivalent Strong-DISM 
native file also behaved as in the edgy.stmdism’s execution. However, this time, nat and inst 
values were stored to memory from registers and loaded from memory into registers during a 
combination of all the provided instructions. A -0.91% of performance degradation can be 
considered as a very benign sign. 
 The divide_nat.dism and divide_nat.stdism programs consist of the division of the nat 
10,000 by the nat 2, and the final result of the division printed to the screen. Both programs are 
quasi-identical, except that the divide_nat.stdism contains the Strong-DISM version of the jmp 
instruction. These programs are designed to explore the performance of computations that only 
utilize the registers and, therefore, do not access data memory.  
The benchmarks for their executions (See tables 5.7 and 5.8) show that the native DISM 
program executed by the Strong-DISM interpreters produced an equal but negligible -0.45% 
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performance degradation for strong-sim-dism and strong_mem-sim-dism, while the results for 
divide_nat.stdism execution show that one the two implementations of Strong-DISM may have 
benefited more from the underlying structure supporting type annotation for registers when 
running code containing instructions native to the language with -1.23% for strong-sim-dism and 
-3.37% for strong_mem-sim-dism. In general, these benchmarks show that the implementation of 
dynamic type checking does not degrade the execution of programs by much. 
The files nm.dism and nm.stdism programs are very similar with the exception that 
nm.stdism contains the jmp instruction from Strong-DISM language. They both are designed to 
produce computations on registers. Both programs simulate a user entering two numbers where 
the first number is printed to screen as many times as the second number. In essence, these 
programs are very similar to divide_nat.stdism or divide_nat.dism as they do not access the data 
memory to perform stores or loads, and all the action is focused on the registers. The 
benchmarks (see tables 5.3 and 5.4) show that strong-sim-dism performance’s degradation (-
1.82% and -0.3) is slightly smaller that strong_mem-sim-dism (-3.04% and -3.34%), but they are 
within the expected range of degradation based on other similar executions. 
 Finally, on the simple.dism program the Strong-DISM simulators performed as expected, 
-0.16% for strong-sim-dism and -0.49% for strong_mem-sim-dism. The execution of program 
simple.stdim yielded -0.33% for strong-sim-dism and -0.49% for strong_mem-sim-dism. This 
program simply printed the initial nat value of a register and halted for the DISM version, and 
printed the initial nat value, printed the type of the register, and the halted for the Strong-DISM 
version. The type checks for the Strong-DISM version only happen during execution of the hlt 
instruction, which is minimal. Here the benchmarks suggest that the strong-sim-dism 
implementation of type annotation for registers performs a little bit faster as that is the only 
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difference between the Strong-DISM implementations. Nevertheless, the overall results for these 
executions are positive since the performance degradation is less than 1% for all. 
 The overall performance of the Strong-DISM interpretes behaved as expected, with the 
tendency of strong-sim-dism to perform better in computations that just used registers and 
strong_mem-sim-dism  to perform better on programs that made stores and loads to and from 
data memory. The average of all the combined performance degradations for all the Strong-
DISM benchmarks yielded a mere -1.41% which is not significantly detrimental considering the 
possibility of gaining programs’ soundness with respect to types.  
 One of the positive aspects observed during this benchmarking was the enhanced 
visibility of every step of the program execution, as not only all the steps could be output to the 
screen, but every step of execution could be played one by one as they happened. This was an 
extension to what was already built in DISM. Also the operational rules for type checking were 
very clear and straightforward to apply, leaving little room for implementation or logical errors.  
5.4  Types in Action 
 The programs of figures 5.1 and 5.2 (see below) contains code that simulates the 
conditions present during a buffer overflow. Suppose that program 1 is executing and runs out of 
execution time at instruction 10, add 2 3 4, and it is sent the waiting queue. Then, program 2 
executes and finishes. When program 1 resumes its execution, the return address that was stored 
on the array will have changed as it had been overwritten by program 2. Then, in the case of 
DISM, when the jmp instruction of program 1 is executed, if the value of the overwritten 
instruction is part of the program, it will allow the jump, but the program will not follow its 
expected execution (unless the return address had been overwritten with the same value), or the 
program execution will be interrupted.  
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1          ;Program 1 – Writes an array of ten elements, stores the return  
2      ;address, and loads the RA, before jumping to it 
3  mov 0 0  ; 
4  mov 2 0  ; used as a counter 
5  mov 3 1  ; used to increment by 1 
6  mov 4 10  ; end of the loop 
7  mov 6 #RA  ; put return address in register 6 
8#WRITE: str 2 0 2  ; storing a sequence  
9  add 2 2 3  ; increasing register 2 by 1 
10  bgt 4 2 #WRITE ; 
11  str 2 0 6  ; storing return address 
12  add 2 3 4  ; program performs some other computation 
13  sub 1 3 4  ; program performs some other computation 
14      mov 2 0  ; program computes return address location 
15#GETRA: add 2 2 3  ;  
16  bgt 4 2 #GETRA ; 
17  lod 1 2 0  ; program loads return address 
18  jmp 1 0   ; program jumps to return address 
19#RA: ptn 2   ; 
20  ptn 3   ; 
21  ptn 4   ; 
22  ptn 6   ; 
23#END: hlt 0   ; 
Figure 5.1  Example of conditions needed for a buffer overrun. Program 1. 
 
0          ;Program 2 – Writes an array of 15 elements containing  
1          ;the nat 18 
2  mov 0 0  ; 
3  mov 1 13  ; 
4  mov 4 15  ; 
5  mov 2 0  ;used as a counter 
6  mov 3 1  ; 
7  ptn 1   ; 
8#WRITE: str 2 0 1  ;storing 15 elements 
9  add 2 2 3  ;increasing number stored on register 2 
10  bgt 4 2 #WRITE ; 
11#END: hlt 0   ; 
Figure 5.2  Example of conditions needed for a buffer overrun. Program 2. 
 
 
If the same program is executed on the Strong-DISM interpreter it will produce a 
dynamic type checking exception, because in the context of Strong-DISM, the jmp instruction 
operates over values of type inst, and the value overwritten by program 2 is of type nat. That is 
one of the beauties of type safety; values will be operated on in accordance to their types. One of 
the instructions, ltm, allows for a program to check the type of a value existing in data memory 
before being operated on, offering a great type-safety tool for programmers and for languages 
that use Strong-DISM as a target language.  
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An observation about typed instructions is that they can be restricted to be used by low 
level program from the operating system, eliminating the possibility of manipulation by user 
programs, in a similar fashion to the way automatic memory allocation and garbage collection is 
used.  
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CHAPTER 6: Strong-ARM, Strong-RISC, Strong-ETC. 
 
The idea of implementing support for Strong-style type checking on RISC processors is 
not as far-fetched as it seems, especially with the tendency of buses to grow in size. With the 
latest standardization of 64-bit architectures, larger instruction sizes could allow the use of some 
bits to annotate the operands’ types for a diverse set of instructions. These annotations, in the 
form of flagging bits or integers, in conjunction with a program’s types lookup table could well 
serve as the structural ingredients needed to enforce dynamic type checking. 
Besides the creation of new instructions, Strong-DISM basically associated the operands 
of instructions with types (by the implicit use of labeling), and later, checked the types of the 
operands before executing the instructions. Although, there was no “overloading” of any 
instruction, instructions such add or subtract could have been overloaded if it had been needed. 
For example, instruction variants like add r1:nat r1 r2 and add r1:inst r1 r2 would have served to 
indicate the overloaded addition of two natural numbers or two instructions (given the case that 
in reality instructions could be added).  
In the case of Strong-DISM’s particular implementation, and for the sake of clarity, the 
types have been statically encoded and embedded in the language. However, a version of the 
language in which the programmer would have declared and added arbitrary types to the 
language to be type checked dynamically at runtime could have been implemented. Just the 
programmer’s or compiler’s declaration of an associative lookup table containing the 
instructions and the possible types of operands allowed to be executed (and yielding types 
allowed to be produced) at runtime by an instruction, would have sufficed. If such table had been 
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created, then the insertion of “on the fly” arbitrary types by the programmer –or compiler— 
could have been type checked against such table at runtime anytime an instruction would use an 
operand. Another interesting aspect of this table is that for the concurrent executions of multiple 
programs, each program would have referred to its own table for type checking.     
For the implementation of a Strong-ARM version of a dynamically typed assembly 
language, ARMv7 and 8 architectures already possess a Protected Memory System Architecture 
(PMSA) based on a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) that could be extended to preserve and 
access such tables in a read-only section of memory. Such customization would have allowed to 
read and correlate type flags for values existing on registers or memory with their respective 
types before instructions’ execution. This proposed system would work automatically in system 
‘privileged’ mode, and could, for simplicity, allow the enumeration of types from a given 
compiler for easier implementation. The main obstacle for this dynamic type checking system 
would strive in the lack of bits to flag or annotate the type of a value. However, a solution 
around this issue could be to find a specific format to write the data. For example, similar to the 
arrays declare their size, in which section contiguous to the array is used as a header containing 
the array’s size, a header containing an encoded integer value as the datatype could be used as 
well. The beneficial part is that there is no limit to the amount of types that could be used. The 
assembler needed to support this mechanism would need to take care of creating a section to 
declare the association of types with instructions. 
Initial implementation of Strong- over ARM or over any other RISC (or non-RISC) based 
system, would first focus on adding type support to a large enough subset of instructions from 
the target assembly language, to allow establishing and proving soundness for programs based 
on the selected instructions subset. 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  Summary 
To the effect of exposing the possible conveniences and benefits of a dynamic type 
checking discipline for the study and production of typed assembly languages, a series of formal 
steps were taken. First, a search for instances of related work is performed; second, an untyped 
assembly language to be used as base language for a transformation is presented; then, a 
dynamically typed assembly language is developed from the base language and implemented as 
two variants of the same language with different memory and registers structures, and layouts; 
and finally, benchmarks for the new language implementation, in order to analyze its 
performance and feasibility of the dynamic approach, are obtained.  
During the research of related work, the closest topics found directly connected to this 
thesis were proof-carrying-code, as the oldest; typed assembly language, as the closest; and 
gradual typing as the most recent, but very close topic as well. Close attention was paid to the 
characteristics of dynamic typing intrinsic dynamic nature of the research.  
The scrutiny for TALs revealed that a large body of knowledge with validated research 
exists on the topic; however, most of such work has been done following a static type checking 
discipline. This static approach, due to the bloated and complex code it usually produces, was 
found to require in most cases, a large and complex set of tools, e.g., formal methods and 
theorem provers, to be able to demonstrate the validity of these TALs typing rules as capable of 
preserving the characteristics that render a language as sound.  
  45 
The search for related work on the gradual typing area, similar to TALs, also revealed the 
prevalence of the static type checking discipline. 
Throughout the course of Strong-DISM’s development the following aspects were found 
to be beneficial and convenient: 
§ The implementation was performed following a relatively easy, straightforward, 
and enumerable set of steps.  
§ Simplicity allowed to eliminate hidden runtime aspects of the implementation. 
§ The runtime rules developed were properly aligned and corresponded with the 
dynamic behavior of computations due to the natural parallelism between 
dynamic type checking and the way computations happen at the physical layer.  
§ Large and complex static type checking-related analysis tools did not have to be 
used [3,4,5,6,7].  
§ The code produced was not bloated at all. 
§ The transfer of abstract concepts to code was clear and straightforward.  
§ As Strong-DISM was treated as a target language, investigation areas concerning 
compilation to D-TAL needed not to be covered.  
§ A large body of extensively validated knowledge on TAL is found and it directly 
apply and inserts into the theoretical aspects of D-TAL [2,8,13,14,18,19,20,22,23, 
24,25].  
§ Research and implementation times and cost were reduced.  
§ Resulting language is able to support gradual typing. 
§ D-TAL and static TAL versions equivalently support type’s enforcement. 
§ A remarkable gain of directly observable insights about the mechanics of dynamic 
type checking for TALs is gathered. 
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§ Because this version of D-TAL was implemented as a virtual machine, it has 
made visible, with great level of detail, the behavior of abstract concepts and 
practical mechanisms that would, otherwise, been obscured during the 
transformation of DISM to Strong-DISM. 
§ A relative small number of instructions is really needed to enforce type safety at 
the assembly level.  
 The benchmarks revealed that the two Strong-DISM implementation variants did have an 
averaged performance degradation of -1.41% with respect to DISM, the base language. 
Performance differences for the Strong-DISM implementations were noticeable in programs that 
made stores and loads versus programs who just performed on registers.  
In general, besides the involvements related to the language’s development process, the 
only physical consideration was the need of extra memory, or at least the consideration of a 
typed memory to implement the flagging of values by type, which could be easily implemented 
on existing architectures by the utilization on extra bits to flag values’ types.  Also a variant of 
this implementation that included an associative lookup table of operands types would allow the 
dynamic addition of types with no limit on the amount of types being added.  
7.2  Recommendations 
The following practical recommendations may prove to be beneficial for the 
implementation of low level dynamic type checking: it must be implemented to be handled 
automatically by the system in a sort of privileged mode; it must be kept transparent to the 
programmer to guarantee no tampering with the value-types –analog to the way memory 
allocation renders a language unsound if the action is left under the programmer’s control versus 
having a system of memory allocation and garbage collection; the type checking rules must be 
implemented as close to the physical layer as possible, if not at the physical layer, to make 
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possible not only a faster execution but to reduce the possibility of tampering. Finally, to close 
the gap of exploits utilizing memory as a channel of insertion, memory must be always type 
checked, and values that could be construed as operands must always be type-annotated. If the 
total physical memory of a system is too expensive to type check, there should be, at least, some 
level of type checking present ultimately at the closest to registers cache level, or (maybe in 
detriment of the instruction size) a pre-conceived format that reserved bits to be used as type 
markers could be used. 
7.3  Future Work 
 Future work would involve producing an implementation of Strong- over ARM (or any 
other feasible existing processor) including the provision of formal type safety and soundness 
proofs of Strong-‘s execution on programs translated from a given high level language. Also the 
provision of more carefully crafted benchmarks on the performance of Strong-’s in general, but 
with emphasis on the analysis of type checking on flagged memory containing contiguous 
multiple datatypes performance would be considered for future work. 
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